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Abstract 
 
This article provides a recommendation to improve the opt-out mechanism in the 
group coordination proceedings in EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings recast 
(EIR recast).1 This recommendation aims to encourage cooperation of insolvency 
practitioners of group member companies and prevent abusive strategies of senior 
creditors.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The EIR recast is a fairly new rule which has not yet come into effect.2 It provides a 
general cooperation and coordination legal framework which improve certainty and 
possibility to preserve the value of multinational corporate groups(MCGs). However, 
the most obvious issue of group coordination proceedings is that individual 
companies which are part of the group can opt-out of group coordination proceedings. 
As a result, the utility of such a framework is doubtful.   
 
This article will first provide an overview of group coordination proceedings. 
Secondly, it analyzes the ability of group coordination proceedings to preserve group 
                                                          
1 The new group coordination proceeding in EIR recast is the first formal cross-border insolvency 
framework which specifically deals with cross-border insolvency of multinational corporate groups. 
Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings 
2 It shall apply from 26 June 2017 see Art. 92 EIR recast 
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going concern value with reference to its opt-out mechanism. The main concern is 
that certain senior creditors or investors of subsidiaries can gain control of the 
subsidiaries easily by means of providing refinancing or buying debt in the secondary 
debt market; they may opt out of the group coordination proceedings in their own 
interests. For example, they may conduct a quick pre-pack sale of some subsidiaries at 
undervalued price without even considering the group rescue options. One may 
ascribe these undesirable possibilities to the inherent issues of legal tools such as 
pre-pack or refinancing tools. Finally, it offers a modest recommendation which 
works as a constraint on the invocation of the opt-out mechanism in group 
coordination proceedings. 
 
1. EIR group coordination proceedings 
 
From a regulatory perspective, there are generally four approaches to be identified to 
regulate group insolvency law, which are substantive consolidation, procedural 
consolidation, procedural cooperation and ignoring the necessity of rules for group 
insolvency.3Substantive and procedural consolidation may cause uncertainty to 
creditors as these mechanisms all cause changes of insolvency law in an international 
context. Retaining the status quo on the other hand may cause a multinational 
corporate group fall into pieces so that the economic value of the group will be more 
likely lost. 
 
EIR recast4does not take a huge leap towards adopting substantive or procedural 
consolidation.5 Rather, it adopts a modest way by adding one group chapter into the 
                                                          
3Gerard McCormack, ‘Reforming the European insolvency regulation: a legal and policy perspective’ 
P57 
4Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings 
5 Stephan Madaus, 'Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency Regulation' 
2015 p3 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2648850 
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EIR recast focusing on coordination and cooperation among practitioners and courts.  
 
It may be helpful to organize a cross-border insolvency case involving groups of 
companies in a court-coordinated fashion, especially where private restructuring is not 
a possible option. Group coordination proceedings can be seen as an improvement 
compared to the previous version of EU regulation which consisted of nothing in 
regard to groups of companies.6In the EIR recast, a new Chapter V prescribes 
specifically group coordination proceedings for cross-border insolvency of corporate 
groups.7The ultimate goal of this proceeding is to provide a group reorganization plan 
for the whole group so that the value of the group could be preserved in a desirable 
way. 
 
Chapter V retains the 'communication and cooperation obligations' of courts and 
insolvency practitioners.8 In the group context, to connect group members together 
by communication and cooperation is desirable. For example, by cooperation,  
information of other members could be obtained; it is also a very important 
pre-condition to a successful rescue.9 
 
What is more, Chapter V also provides a framework for the coordination of group 
corporate insolvency. To conduct a group-wide reorganization, a group coordination 
plan10 can be proposed by a coordinator appointed by any court in which the 
                                                          
6 Reinhard Bork Renato Mangano, European cross-border insolvency law OUP Oxford 2016 P291 
7 Chapter V of EIR recast 
8 When insolvency practitioners of one group member believe that it would be better to liquidate the 
assets by a group restructuring plan, they may suggest such plan to other insolvency practitioners of 
other member companies under general cooperation and communication basis. see also Art 56 (2) (c) 
'Insolvency practitioners shall consider whether possibilities exist for restructuring group members 
which are subject to insolvency proceedings and, if so, coordinate with regard to the proposal and 
negotiation of a coordinated restructuring plan.' 
9 Chris Howard, Bob Hedger, Restructuring and law & practice, LNUK 2014 
10Art 72 (1)(b) 'The coordinator shall propose a group coordination plan that identifies, describes and 
recommends a comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated approach to the resolution 
of the group members' insolvencies.' 
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insolvency proceeding of one group member is opened; insolvency practitioners of 
different insolvent subsidiaries can also jointly decide an eligible court for the purpose 
of group coordination proceedings . All these efforts are made to facilitate multiple 
group insolvency proceedings such that these proceedings of member companies can 
be coordinated and a better result can be achieved.11The key function of group 
coordination proceedings is to provide a platform for coordinators to consider 
recommendations and group coordination plans for the whole group.12The group 
coordination plans are the fulcrum of the group coordination proceedings; one may 
imagine that relevant group member companies which join in the proceeding may 
decide to draft a coordinated recovery plan by extending debt maturity or selling 
group assets to repay debts.13 
 
The coordinator14has the power to arrange the multiple proceedings. To facilitate the 
group coordination proceeding, the coordinators also enjoy power such as to 
participate in any foreign hearing and creditors’ meetings, to present plans to the 
relevant creditors, or to make a stay on the insolvency proceedings which are subject 
to the group coordination proceedings.15Such stay power may help to deal with the 
'commons issues' where an individual company would like to pursue a different goal 
which may break up the group rescue plan.16Coordinators therefore enjoy the power 
                                                          
11 Stephan Madaus, 'Insolvency proceedings for corporate groups under the new Insolvency 
Regulation' 2015 p10 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2648850;  
12 EIR recast Art. 70  
13 However, such plan should not include substantive consolidation as it may fundamentally change 
the creditors’ pre-insolvency rights without justification. Gabriel Moss QC, Ian. Fletcher QC, Stuart 
Isaacs QC, The EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings third edition OUP Oxford 2016 P516 
14 EIR recast Art.72 (2) e 
15 EIR recast Art 72 
16 Insolvency practitioners under EIR recast enjoy a general stay power which can be used if certain 
requirements are met, on other insolvency proceedings. One of the requirements is a reasonable chance 
of success; another is such stay benefit the member company on which the stay is imposed. Art 60 
(i)(iii) New EU regulation. Coordinator' stay power may be invalid to certain group member companies 
if certain group members decided not to follow the group plan. 
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to make stay to resolve this problem either in the case of group reorganization aiming 
for recovery or a group sale of assets.17 
The group coordination proceedings cannot be employed to extract value from other 
subsidiaries to the parent companies or vice versa. A pre-condition on the court that 
decides to open group coordination proceedings is that none of the subsidiaries which 
join in the coordination proceeding is likely to be financially disadvantaged.18The 
court should therefore conduct a preliminary cost and benefit analysis to convince it 
that the benefit is no less than the cost of such proceeding.19Therefore, group 
coordination proceedings provide a more concrete framework where all the relevant 
insolvency practitioners and courts could reach a group-wide deal. 
As a result, group coordination proceedings are welcome development as they provide 
a general group insolvency framework which not only has the potential to preserve 
the group value, but can also provide certainty.20The voluntary opt-out mechanism 
provides some certainty and flexibility to the group members. For example, if one 
subsidiary believes that the group plan is harmful to the creditors of it, the insolvency 
practitioners of this subsidiary could choose to opt-out of the group plan.  
2Problems of group coordination proceedings 
 
Group coordination proceedings may have the potential ability to preserve the group 
going concern value, as they aim to connect the group members via one group 
coordination proceeding. The flip side is that the desire and effort to rescue the group 
                                                          
17 By contrast, without the opening of group coordination proceedings, the insolvency practitioner of 
one member companies can only make a stay on other insolvency proceedings only if a group wide sale 
is possible. See Art.60 (b) EU regulation. See also Gabriel Moss QC, Ian. Fletcher QC, Stuart Isaacs 
QC, The EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings third edition OUP Oxford 2016 P516 
18 EIR recast Art 63(b)  
19 See EIR recast Recital 58 and see also Reinhard Bork Renato Mangano, European cross-border 
insolvency law OUP Oxford 2016 p294 
20 Group coordination proceedings respect entity law, it does not pool the assets and claims of different 
group members together. 
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may be dampened if an important group member which forms valuable relationships 
with other group member companies could voluntarily choose to opt-out of the group 
coordination proceedings without any limitations. The next section will focus on this 
opt-out mechanism. 
2.1 Opt-out mechanism of group coordination proceedings 
 
The group coordination proceedings can be objected to by the insolvency practitioners 
of any member companies, the consequence being that those member companies are 
unaffected by the group coordination proceedings.21The opt-out mechanism has 
attracted criticism from some scholars and it is generally believed that the 
effectiveness of group coordination proceeding will therefore be negatively affected.22  
Since the cost of cooperation will be increased due to the incentives for hold-out, the 
cost of group coordination proceedings may outweigh the benefits they could bring to 
creditors.23Also, rejection of inclusion has an automatic effect without any restrictions 
from the court which opens group coordination proceedings.24Art 64 (3) also provides 
that such objection of inclusion could obtain the approval from the court where such 
dissident insolvency practitioners are appointed if it is required under the local 
insolvency law. In other words, if the local law does not require court approval, the 
opt-out is in the hands of the insolvency practitioners without scrutiny of courts. 
 
                                                          
21 EIR recast Art.64  
22 Christoph Thole, and Manuel Dueñas, 'Some Observations on the New Group Coordination 
Procedure of the Reformed European Insolvency Regulation'Int. Insolv. Rev., Vol. 24 (2015) p224; 
Kristin Van Zwieten, 'An introduction to the European Insolvency Regulation, as made and as recast' R 
Bork and K van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation Oxford University 
Press, 2016 p53; Jessica Schmidt, 'Group insolvency under the EIR recast' Eurofenix Autumn 2015 
23Kristin Van Zwieten, 'An introduction to the European Insolvency Regulation, as made and as recast' 
R Bork and K van Zwieten (eds), Commentary on the European Insolvency Regulation Oxford 
University Press, 2016 p53 
24 Gabriel Moss QC, Ian. Fletcher QC, Stuart Isaacs QC, The EU Regulation on insolvency 
proceedings Third Edition OUP Oxford 2016 P510 
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The reason why group coordination proceedings include an opt-out mechanism for the 
insolvency practitioners is to avoid the potential coercive inclusion of any group 
members.25The EIR is based on entity law, and therefore, each subsidiary's interests 
should be protected.26That is to say that the goal of preservation of group value should 
not trump the importance of creditors' protection of subsidiaries. 
 
The above compromise leaves the non-binding group coordination proceeding  as 
having low effectiveness, as the parties may simply choose not to coordinate.27 
Nonetheless, the concern should not be overestimated. The opt-out itself is a 
protection to every single subsidiary especially in the case where the group going 
concern value is not large enough to cover the cost of cooperation so that the group 
plan will likely decrease the value of subsidiaries.  
Supporting a group plan at the cost of subsidiaries takes issue with the rationale of 
limited liability which are well established.28 In the context of group insolvency, 
respecting each subsidiary is a basic requirement confirmed by the ECJ Eurofood 
case29.Also, the directors of the subsidiaries in fact have no obligations to other 
subsidiaries or creditors of those subsidiaries; directors only aim to achieve success 
for their own companies and creditors.30Similarly, the office-holders such as 
                                                          
25 Jessica Schmidt, 'Group insolvency under the EIR recast' Eurofenix Autumn 2015 p18 
26 EU regulation on insolvency proceedings recast 2015, Recital 52, Cooperation between the 
insolvency practitioners should not run counter to the interests of the creditors in each of the 
proceedings, and such cooperation should be aimed at finding a solution that would leverage synergies 
across the group. 
27Samantha Bewick, ‘The EU Insolvency Regulation, Revisited’ Int. Insolv. Rev. (2015) P17 see also 
Michael Weiss, ‘Bridge over Troubled Water: The Revised Insolvency Regulation’ Int. Insolv. Rev. 
(2015) 
28 Such as reducing risks, encouraging investment, mitigating transaction cost. see F. Easterbrook and 
D. Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’, 52 University of Chicago Law Review (1985) p. 89 
see also Irit Mevorach, 'The Role of Enterprise Principles in Shaping Management Duties at Times of 
Crisis' European Business Organization Law Review Volume 14Issue 04 2013 p477 
29 Eurofood [2006] Ch.508 
30 Irit Mevorach, 'The Role of Enterprise Principles in Shaping Management Duties at Times of Crisis' 
European Business Organization Law Review Volume 14Issue 04 2013 p480 
8 
 
administrators are agents of the companies and they only owe duties to the companies 
where they are appointed; administrators only promote the interests for creditors of 
the companies to which they are appointed.31All these reasons support the opt-out 
mechanism. 
However, a complete free opt-out option may ignore the possibility that in certain 
cases, such opt-out neither serves the interests of creditors of the hold-out subsidiaries, 
nor does it serve for the interests of creditors of the whole group. It is one thing that 
the insolvency practitioners of some companies would like to stay in the market by 
means of administration, while the administrators of other group members may prefer 
leaving the market by a sale of the business;32but it is another thing that certain senior 
creditors of subsidiaries who have controlled the companies can choose to opt-out of 
the group plan while taking strategies that benefit only themselves. An example could 
be a pre-pack fire sale of the subsidiary irrespective of a better group plan which can 
benefit all the creditors. The latter cases are the main problems whereby they render 
the group rescue plan vulnerable to the strategic actions of some creditors or investors. 
The next section will provide a further discussion on this issue.  
2.2. Creditors' control and its implication on group coordination proceedings 
Group coordination proceedings do not necessarily deal with a free fall insolvency of 
groups of companies where all the group members enter into group proceedings in 
different member states. As in many group cases financing is arranged at the parent 
companies' level,33group insolvency cases may in fact only involve one or more 
                                                          
31 Sch. B1 para 3(2); see also Ian Fletcher, The law of insolvency, 4th Edition Sweet & Maxwell 
London 2009 p568 
32Burkhard Hess, Paul Oberhammer, Thomas Pfeiffer, European insolvency law 
Heidelberg-Luxemburg-Vienna report Hart Publishing Oxford 2014 P222 
33 Isabel Giancristofano, 'Third party securities in the financial restructuring of corporate groups In 
Germany. International corporate rescue 13(2) 2016 p111 
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holding companies.34Also, the subsidiaries in one group may have the same creditors 
who are bound by one set of loan documents sitting at the level of holding companies. 
It is possible to argue that in these cases, certain creditors will not be able to take 
individual action to control one single subsidiary as they are all bound by one 
inter-creditor agreement.  
However, this is not always the case. It is possible that member companies in one 
group have different profiles of senior creditors; 35it is also possible that certain 
investors become creditors of subsidiaries later via buying debts at distressed debt 
market. In the latter cases, creditors or investors may not aim to preserve the group 
going concern value; rather, they may try to control the valuable subsidiaries simply 
because their value is underestimated. Allowing these creditors to invoke opt-out 
mechanism freely will make the goal of preservation the group going concern value 
difficult to achieve. Their inconsistent strategies may not only cut off the relationships 
of group members companies in the MCGs, but also create uncertainty to stakeholders. 
This section first provides an overview of creditors' control on the debt restructuring 
practice. Then it moves to discuss the implication on the group coordination 
proceedings. 
2.2.1 Senior creditors' control 
Senior creditors or investors could gain control via providing refinancing or buy 
cheaper debt in the secondary debt market. These senior creditors therefore could, to 
some extent, influence the debt restructuring plan.36It is entirely possible that the 
                                                          
34 These holding companies may deal with financial creditors in a package of loan documents and 
on-lend money to subsidiaries. see Antony Zacaroli QC, Alexander Riddiford, 'Schemes of 
arrangement and chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code: a comparative view' South square digest 2015 p2 
35 Proposals for the revision of the European Insolvency Regulation – a step forward in the rescue 
culture? Linklaters 2012 p4 
36Michelle M Harner, Jamie Marincic, 'Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business 
Reorganizations' 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1155 2010-2011p1158 
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senior creditors could expect a sale of business to other buyers or own it by 
themselves.37 
Refinancing terms frequently constitute the main provisions of the reorganization plan. 
As the value of the cash-starved companies can only be kept when the company is 
operating, refinancing enables the companies to make payment to employees and 
trader creditors of operating subsidiaries. The protection of the new money provided 
after the opening of insolvency proceedings will be granted priority to most of 
pre-insolvency debts or at least enjoy the same priority status with some secured debt. 
38By providing refinancing, the creditors may gain bargaining power over cash 
starved companies so that the creditors may in fact force debtors to extract value from 
other creditors to the ones who provide new money. Refinancing should be 
encouraged to the extent that such new money could create new value; it should not 
be used as a tool to redistribute value.39 
 
Certain types of refinancing terms and practice may not bring in value to the debtors' 
insolvency estate; rather they may lead to value redistribution: roll-up and 
cross-collateralization. Roll-up describes the situation where certain lenders' 
pre-insolvency unsecured debts transform into part of the post-insolvency debts so 
that all the debts of the lenders enjoy priority over other creditors. 40 
Cross-collateralization happens where the lenders have pre-insolvency debts which 
are full secured. As a result, the lenders require that the post-insolvency assets must 
                                                          
37 Michelle M Harner, Jamie Marincic, 'Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business 
Reorganizations' 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1155 2010-2011p1158 
38Oscar Couwenberg, Stephen J. Lubben, 'Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law' University of 
Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper Series No. 04/2013p8-9 p15 
39George G. Triantis, 'A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing' 46 Vand. L. Rev. 
901 1993 p903 
40Gerard McCormack, 'Super-priority new financing and corporate rescue' Journal of Business Law 
2007 p8 
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be used to secure their pre-insolvency debts as well.41In other words, the 
pre-insolvency unsecured debts start to enjoy priority over other creditors due to the 
cross-collateralization clause. The overall effect of these refinancing methods is to 
exploit unsecured creditors and preferential creditors who would have ranked higher 
or pari passu with the lenders' unsecured pre-insolvency debts. 
Courts and court appointed monitors need to hold refinancing in check; the purpose is 
to prevent refinancing becoming the power to redistribute value from junior creditors 
to senior creditors. 42 
Another thing that may happen may be that certain investors have the incentives to 
control or own the subsidiaries in their own interests.43 These creditors or investors 
may achieve this aim by exerting loan-to-own strategies in the debt market. The result 
would be that certain subsidiaries are pulled out of the group coordination proceeding. 
This is because that the investors may believe that it is the subsidiaries rather than the 
whole group that they want to purchase. For example, if one foreign subsidiary plays 
very important R&D functions in the group, the investors or local senior creditors 
may want to absorb it into their own groups. However, it does not mean that the 
buyers can use the assets of the subsidiary in a more efficient way than the distressed 
group. Also, without the subsidiary, other group members in the distressed MCG may 
lack going concern value as they rely on the relationships with the subsidiary. 
                                                          
41 Charles J. Tabb, 'A critical reappraisal of cross-collateralization in bankruptcy' 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
109 1986-1987 p112 
42 Some countries' refinancing rules may work well to avoid roll-up or cross collateralization. For 
example, the UK insolvency act 1986 provided that the contract entered into by administrator would 
enjoy priority to administrators' remuneration and floating charge. Therefore, it is clear that senior 
creditors who advance post-insolvency financing cannot assert that their pre-insolvency unsecured 
debts can enjoy any priority as their pre-insolvency loans are simply not the debts incurred by the 
administrators. See Insolvency Act 1986 B1 99, Gerard McCormack, 'Super-priority new financing and 
corporate rescue' Journal of Business Law 2007 p13 
43 Michelle, M. Harner, 'Activist investors, distressed companies, and value uncertainty'22 Am. Bankr. 
Inst. L. Rev. 167 2014 
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Also, it could be the case that some investors who are only interested in short-term 
profit, such as many hedge funds, believe that one subsidiary is undervalued and they 
would like to buy low and sell high later. They may opt out the group rescue option 
straightaway. As a result, the rescue of the subsidiaries is arranged following these 
investors’ preferred track. 
All these examples show that group coordination proceedings should put a limitation 
on the use of opt-out mechanism, as creditors of the distressed MCGs may not 
necessarily organized by concentrated contracts. Senior creditors may gain control 
and use the opt-out mechanism to pursue their own interests. The next section will 
provide more discussion on this issue. 
2.2.2 Implication on group coordination proceedings 
 
No matter which way creditors could gain control of the subsidiaries, the most 
important implication on group coordination proceedings may be that local senior 
creditors or investors of subsidiaries may have their own reorganization plans which 
are different from the group plan provided by the coordinator. The group plan and 
subsidiaries' plans may clash with each other. The key is to decide which one the local 
insolvency practitioner should pursue. 
Senior creditors’ control could be a good thing for several reasons. The competition of 
senior creditors for control can reveal the value of the corporate group. 44For example, 
if the corporate group is worth more as a whole than in pieces, senior creditors may 
try to maintain the integrity of the group assets to achieve maximum recovery. 
                                                          
44The modern financial contracts are very carefully drafted such that the creditors who are in the best 
position to make decisions obtain power to make business judgment. in the US, the most likely DIP 
lenders are the companies’ existing lenders as they have the best information regarding the value of the 
companies. David A. Skeel, Jr, ‘The past, present  and future of debtor-in-possession financing’ 25 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1905 2003-2004 P1917 
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 Also, that competition for control by buying debts may help concentrate the 
fragmented debts; it reduces the intensity of holdout issues. The creditors who try to 
exert the loan-to-own strategies will also want to buy debts at the below par price to 
control the restructuring or insolvency process, in the hope of reaping the undervalued 
asset prices. This debt trading practice will transform the fragmented debts into the 
hands of senior creditors who have informational advantages. The senior creditors are 
therefore in a better position to make decisions regarding how to rescue the distressed 
group. 
 
What is equally important is that in the refinancing cases, by injecting money to 
finance certain members in the group, the insolvency issue could be avoided.45 
Refinancing is therefore a useful method of insolvency planning, and it could decide 
which companies should be put in insolvency proceedings. Financial creditors can use 
financing contracts to gain control of the distressed companies when the companies 
reach the vicinity of insolvency.46Such control may bring in the benefit of better 
decision-making due to certain creditors' information advantages.47 
After all, whether the group should be rescued or whether the assets should be put 
together is a commercial judgment, which depends on whether or not there is group 
going concern value. Such decision is better to allow the creditors and the debtors 
who have the information to decide. 
 
                                                          
45Assume that a cross-default will make the whole group enter into fragmented insolvency proceedings. 
If the group could borrow money at the whole enterprise value, the new money could help the group to 
preserve the value and such solution benefits all the creditor. Gregor Baer and Karen O’Flynn, 
'Financing Company Group Restructurings book review' Insolvency and Restructuring International 
Vol 10 No 1 March 2016p37 
46 Douglas G. Baird& Robert K. Rasmussen 'Private debt and the missing lever of corporate 
governance' 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 2005-2006 p1217 
47Douglas G. Baird& Robert K. Rasmussen 'Private debt and the missing lever of corporate 
governance' 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 2005-2006 p1219 
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Nonetheless, problems may arise in that local senior creditors may also choose not to 
support the beneficial group plan; yet they choose to take advantage of the insolvency 
laws to enrich themselves. In other words, it is possible that creditors' power to exert 
control may be abused by senior creditors to extract value from creditors in general. 
The desirable group plan may not be considered even if the group plan is better to 
serve creditors' interest in general. As a result, the group going concern value may be 
lost. 
Since creditors of different subsidiaries may be of various profiles, they may not be 
bound collectively by one debt instrument. One possibility is that certain senior 
creditors of the subsidiaries would like to conduct a pre-pack sale of the subsidiaries 
for a quick return. If so, they may have no incentive to follow the group coordination 
proceeding even though such participation will benefit the other creditors of 
subsidiaries. As one professor in the US has argued, Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy 
law has been a vehicle which is used not so much as a tool for resolving the 
'commons' issues as for leaving the junior creditors behind. 48 DIP lenders may abuse 
their power to require debtors to conduct a fire sale of the business as a pre-requisite 
of financial support.49These creditors' power should not be used unscrupulously and 
such power requires examination by courts or monitors. Among other things, one 
important job the courts need to do is to examine whether the refinancing lenders try 
to inappropriately improve their unsecured part of debts by exerting their bargaining 
power. 50 
 
All these problems are not group specific issues. They are in fact the shortcomings of 
refinancing mechanisms and pre-pack mechanisms. However, these mechanisms are 
                                                          
48 Douglas G. Baird, Robert K. Rasmussen, 'Chapter 11 at twilight' 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673 2003-2004 
p697 
49 George W Kuney, 'Hijacking Chapter 11' 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 19 2004-2005 p108 
50 David A. Skeel, Jr, 'Creditors' ball: the "new" new corporate governance in Chapter 11' 152 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 917 2003-2004 p941-942 
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part of insolvency law which, if applied properly, have significant value. For example, 
refinancing options can resolve the insolvency-specific issue--debt overhang. 51The 
distressed companies may be so deeply in debt distress that they cannot invest in 
efficient investment to trade out of insolvency. In insolvency, the agency issue 
becomes acute. On the one hand, the shareholders have no incentive to invest new 
money to facilitate investments which may be efficient.52However, debtors may not 
be able to attract new money invested by the new creditors, as they are afraid of most 
of the proceeds earned from the investment being obtained by the existing senior 
creditors. Therefore, insolvency law provides incentives to attract new money which 
allows distressed companies to be kept alive and to engage in efficient investment. 
To mitigate the problems caused by some national restructuring tools, a modest 
solution is to consider the possibility of improving the group coordination 
proceedings under the existing provisions.  
3 Recommendations 
3.1 The aim of the opt-out mechanism 
The recitals of the EIR recast have made it clear that the group coordination aims to 
provide efficient administration for groups of companies and the opt-out mechanism 
aims to respect the legal personality of each entity in the same group.53In other words, 
the EIR recast tries to strike a balance between certainty which requires the law to 
respect creditors' protection of each member companies and maximization of the 
group going concern value. 
                                                          
51 Distressed debtors have difficulties to raise money for further investment which could be profitable 
due to the large part of proceeds will be reaped by existing senior creditors. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. 
Skeel Jr. ' Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider' 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1557 2013 p1571 
52George G. Triantis, 'A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing' 46 Vand. L. Rev. 
901 1993 p911-912 
53 Recital 54-57 EIR recast 2015 
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The opt-out mechanism reflects this aim, due to its voluntary nature. Creditors of one 
company in the group know that at the time of advancing credit, their interest will not 
be mixed with creditors of other group subsidiaries.54 On the other hand, group 
coordination proceedings provide a framework for the group companies to cooperate 
and coordinate together via a group plan at the behest of the same coordinator. 
However, at the same time as the certainty of the group coordination proceeding is 
hailed, its efficacy is doubted, especially against the background when certain 
creditors could exert strong control to the distressed companies. 
As the above sections have mentioned, since senior creditors and investors can gain 
control of distressed companies by refinancing contracts or loan to own debt trading, 
the result could render a group plan dampened due to their uncooperative and abusive 
strategies. Particularly, in the groups of companies context, without necessary 
limitations on the invocation of opt-out mechanism provided by the group 
coordination proceedings, the group plan cannot be expected to be respected by 
certain powerful creditors in subsidiaries even if the group plan can better serve the 
creditors in general. 
The option of opting out of a group rescue plan, if it can be used correctly, may reveal 
that the going concern value of the group is not large enough to benefit the subsidiary 
which chooses to opt out the plan. Also, the rejection of inclusion may reveal that the 
subsidiaries may be undervalued. An example would be that local creditors or other 
investors who have better information regarding assets of the subsidiaries,( such as its 
business networks with local partners, or its mandate for research and development 
head office function), would like to pay a high price to purchase the subsidiary. All 
this information may not be available to the parent company which focuses on cash 
management or other financial tasks. 
                                                          
54 Certainty is the not only merit of group coordination proceedings, but also the requirement of 
insolvency law. 
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However, the local rescue plans may not always be in the interests of all the creditors 
of the subsidiaries. It is in this latter case that one needs to be cautious in that the 
recovery rate from the local insolvency plan which is abused by the local senior 
creditors or investors may be lower than that of group plan, as the latter could release 
the group going concern value offered by the coordinator. The voluntary nature of the 
opt-out mechanism makes subsidiaries too easy to opt-out the group rescue plan 
without even considering the possibility of the group rescue plan. Even in the case 
where the group plan has been proposed, one insolvency practitioner appointed by 
one subsidiary can still choose to opt out.  
On the legislation level, it would be welcome if the problems of certain rules such as 
refinancing or pre-pack could be fixed.55 However, to avoid the above issue,  the 
opt-out mechanism requires something more than that. As long as group members 
have different views regarding rescue, and the creditors' profiles are varying, the 
coordination proceeding seems to be vulnerable to the anti-commons issue that 
insolvency law is designed to resolve. Without any method of dealing with 
anti-commons, the purpose of insolvency law such as maximization of the value of 
the debtor’s insolvency estate is difficult to achieve. 
To achieve the goals of preservation of group going concern value, the opt-out 
mechanism should not be invoked without any limitations or scrutiny. The aim is not 
to coerce the subsidiaries to follow the group reorganization plan. In fact, the aim is to 
make sure the individual plans and the group plan are both considered by insolvency 
practitioners so a better option can be selected. The final decision-making power is 
still vested in the insolvency practitioners of each company in the same group. 
However, insolvency practitioners of subsidiaries could make a wiser decision based 
                                                          
55Under some countries 's insolvency law, courts may play a role to examine the refinancing terms such 
as roll-up and cross-collateralization and loan to own strategies need to be scrutinized carefully as they 
can be employed to redistribute assets from junior creditors to senior creditors. Legislators also put in 
effort in fixing the weakness of pre-pack. See US bankruptcy courts. David A. Skeel, Jr, ‘The past, 
present  and future of debtor-in-possession financing’ 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905 2003-2004 P1907 
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on more information and have more rescue options by comparing the group plan and 
individual plans. 
For the purpose of maximization of value for creditors, insolvency practitioners need 
to consider all the options available to the companies. The options include joining in a 
group plan to benefit from the group going concern value or taking an individual 
rescue plan to avoid an implausibly costly group plan. Therefore, insolvency 
practitioners have to compare and assess whether the group plan is a better option to 
the company in which they are appointed. No matter whether they decide to join or 
refuse the group plan, they should consider it when they consider the individual 
reorganization plans. After a holistic consideration, they may decide to turn down the 
group plan or individual plan based on a scrupulous judgement. 
In many cases, the parent companies would be the first to know the financial 
difficulties of the group compared to the operating subsidiaries. As parent companies 
are generally the companies that arrange financing on behalf of the group, they may 
possess the best financial information of the group. In these cases, the group 
coordination proceedings may be opened at the court where the parent companies are 
based. For each subsidiary, the task of the insolvency practitioners is to consider 
whether the group option offers subsidiaries a better option. 
It is also possible that the debts of the group are not arranged at the holding 
companies level so that the parent company has no informational advantages. 
Therefore the individual option may be negotiated prior to the group rescue option. 
Taking a pre-pack sale case as an example, the creditors of subsidiaries may choose to 
execute a fast sale of the subsidiaries without considering the group plan. The 
pre-pack is notorious for a lack of transparency, creditors' protection56  and limited 
                                                          
56 Especially in the UK, the pre-pack sale could be done without creditors' and courts' approval. 
Netherlands and the US requires the court approval, however, the abuses in pre-pack cases still exist. 
Ramon Smits, 'Supervision and efficiency of the pre-pack: An Anglo-Dutch comparison' International 
corporate rescue 13(1) 2016 p35 
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marketing.57At the time of organising a pre-pack sale for a subsidiary, the insolvency 
practitioners of other group member companies may not know about it. When the plan 
has been drafted, the administrator can execute it immediately after he is appointed 
out of court. This leaves other parties with no time to challenge it or offers a group 
rescue solution. 
Therefore, it is not easy to respect an individual company for certainty on the one 
hand and preserve group going concern value on the other hand. How to strike this 
balance will be considered in the next section. 
 
3.2 The balance of group option and individual option 
Since parent companies may allocate certain head office functions to their subsidiaries, 
subsidiaries may have better information than parent companies in regard to how to 
use such power and how to keep subsidiaries operating in viable ways. It is possible 
that subsidiaries may have a basic understanding of the value of themselves, such as 
the valuable employees and relationships with key suppliers. Similarly, coordinators 
and group bidders may have better information regarding the value of the whole 
group. The information they possess may allow them to value the subsidiaries against 
the backdrop of the group going concern value. 
The communication of all relevant information between insolvency practitioners of 
subsidiaries and insolvency practitioners who propose group coordination proceedings 
is desirable. Firstly, the information of insolvency practitioners who aim to open a 
group proceeding may provide clues regarding whether the group going concern value 
exists and whether it is large enough to cover the cost of coordination. Secondly, local 
insolvency practitioners' information may be used to prevent one individual 
subsidiary from being undervalued by the potential bidders for the whole group. 
                                                          
57 Tom Astle, ' Pack up your troubles: addressing the negative image of pre-packs' Insolvency 
Intelligence 2015 p1-2 
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Thirdly, information of coordinators or group bidders can prevent local senior 
creditors from talking down the value of subsidiaries they control.  
Local senior creditors or investors who decide to opt-out of the group coordination 
proceedings may have incentive to block the flow of information relevant to the true 
value of the subsidiaries against local junior creditors and other stakeholders. When 
the negotiation comes to the table of general local creditors, local senior creditors may 
have an incentive to undervalue the subsidiaries so as to extract value, such as what 
may happen in a pre-pack. By contrast, when the deal happens between local senior 
creditors and group bidders, local senior creditors or investors may overestimate the 
value of subsidiaries with the aim of striking a better deal with the bidders who wish 
to purchase the whole group.  
The difference of the two prices may be remarkable, since the local senior creditors 
may only have incentive to benefit themselves either by extracting value from others 
or by hold-out. A possible solution is to facilitate the exchange of information  and 
the communication between relevant group companies so that the true value of an 
individual subsidiary and the value of the group could be revealed. 
One limitation of the invocation of the opt-out mechanism can be found in current 
provisions under the EIR recast to deal with the above undesirable situation. The EIR 
recast prescribes that insolvency practitioners in each subsidiary shall exchange 
information and consider the possibilities of coordination plans and restructuring 
plans.58 Also, other insolvency practitioners should be informed at an early stage of 
the main content of coordination for the purpose of coordination proceedings.59At the 
same time, Article 72(2) gives coordinators the power to request information from 
other courts and explain their group coordination plan to other courts and creditor 
meetings. All these provisions could be considered as limitations of opt-out as 
insolvency practitioners in each member company of the same group have obligation 
                                                          
58 EIR recast Article 56. 
59 EIR recast Recital 56 
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to consider the possibilities of a group plan at the time of considering the individual 
rescue plan. They therefore need to communicate and inform the other insolvency 
practitioners of other member companies regarding the individual plan at an early 
stage.  
 
Such interpretation corresponds to national insolvency law as well. Taking the UK as 
an example, the third version of the statement of insolvency practice 1660 requires the 
administrator to decide whether it is appropriate to conduct a pre-pack sale for the 
creditors in general rather than the managers or purchasers.61Administrators not only 
need to carry out broad marketing for the sale of the business, but also need to 
disclose information to the creditors to the extent that informed creditors could judge 
whether the pre-pack is a good solution to the company.62One may therefore argue 
that without considering the group plan, it is difficult for the administrator of one 
subsidiary to make the final judgment that saving the subsidiary individually is best in 
the interest of all the creditors of that subsidiary. The administrators may skip broad 
marketing which may solicit purchasers who would like to pay a price reflecting the 
group going concern value. The consequence is that the creditors of that subsidiary do 
not receive the possible surplus from the group going concern value. 
With such interpretation in mind, certain abuses of the opt-out mechanism may be 
mitigated. Taking the pre-pack of one subsidiary as an example. in a typical UK 
pre-pack case, the insolvency plan is generally negotiated between certain senior 
creditors and debtors before the appointment of an administrator. Immediately or 
shortly after the appointment of the administrator, the administrator is able to sell the 
                                                          
60 Statement of practice 16 issued on 01 November 2015 by R3: Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals 
61 Statement of practice 16 issued on 01 November 2015 by R3: Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals P2 
62 Statement of practice 16 issued on 01 November 2015 by R3: Association of Business Recovery 
Professionals p2 and p4 
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assets of the debtor to the purchaser before the creditors meeting.63Assume that such a 
pre-pack sale plan is negotiated by the senior creditors and directors with the 
involvement of the would-be administrators. As the administrators have to execute the 
deal later, they need to provide enough evidence to explain why the pre-pack plan of 
the subsidiary is the best solution. If they have an obligation to communicate the 
information to other insolvency practitioners or debtor-in-possession, and to consider 
a group restructuring plan at an earlier stage under the EIR recast, their report is not 
convincing without even considering group rescue plans. 
The doubts of such a deal from other parties and courts may rise, especially where the 
law allows insolvency practitioners to conduct a sale of the whole business without 
the approval of creditors and courts as it is in the UK.64Together with the fact that 
administrators could be appointed out of court by holders of floating charge or 
directors, all these procedures and negotiations may be done in bad faith and in 
fleeting time. What the rest of the creditors have to face is a fait accompli conclusion 
that the sale is in the interests of creditors in general. As a result, administrators may 
be responsible for the abuse.  
In some countries such as Netherlands and the US, a pre-pack deal needs courts' 
approval. 65The courts may be good at examining the abuse of law, hence this design 
of pre-pack may to some extent prevent certain abusive uncooperative strategies from 
the subsidiaries.66 Also, the direction of the US pre-pack regulation seems to be 
                                                          
63Brief guide to Administration, Linklaters at 
www.linklaters.com/pdfs/Insights/banking/Guidetoadministration.pdf  2008 p3 
64 Anthony. Wijaya, ‘Pre-Pack Administration Sale: a Case of Sub Rosa Debt Restructuring’ Int. 
Insolv. Rev., Vol. 25  2016 p130 
65 When considering whether to approve the sale, the court may consider whether the sale is a de facto 
reorganization plan while disenfranchising creditor's protection endowed by the confirmation of 
chapter 11 plan. The alertness of the US courts highlight that the removal of the creditors' protection is 
the quid pro qua of fast speed of pre-pack, which may give rise to abuse by senior creditors. Craig A. 
Sloane, 'The sub rosa plan of reorganization: side-stepping creditor protections in chapter 11' 16 Bankr. 
Dev. J. 37 1999-2000 p61 
66 The court scrutiny could be seen as a form of creditors’ protection, as otherwise the creditors’ 
interest may suffer due to unable to join in the coordination proceedings. also it could be viewed as a 
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towards a focus on enhanced protection to creditors in general. 67 However, whether 
the sale is the best solution is a commercial judgment, so that the supervisory role of 
the courts are limited.68More importantly, the courts are not the first to hear about the 
pre-pack deal; replying on court examination will not provide other insolvency 
practitioners enough time to prepare the possibilities of an alternative group 
reorganization plan.  
A desirable solution in the cross-border insolvency of groups of companies context is 
to encourage parties to consider the group reorganization plan and the individual 
group member plan at an earlier stage. 
The group plan may help to reveal the value of the subsidiaries by preservation of 
group going concern value. If the going concern value is large, the group plan may 
offer a higher price for the subsidiary than the price of a local reorganization plan. By 
competition, which offer is better becomes clear. Where the benefit of a group plan is 
obvious, local senior creditors' opt-out is difficult to be justified and supported. Where 
the deal requires courts' approval, courts should not approve the individual plan if 
evidence clearly shows that the group plan will offer the creditors in general of those 
subsidiaries a better recovery. The local senior creditors may not hold out by 
providing evidence of a much higher than reasonable value of one subsidiary. 
Assuming the group bidders give up purchasing the subsidiary, the higher price that 
the local senior creditors have claimed from group bidders will make more junior 
                                                                                                                                                                      
solution to the anti-commons issue as otherwise the subsidiaries may strategically choose to hold-out 
by opting out of the group coordination proceeding as long as it could receive an not proportionate 
payment from other member companies. 
67The US commission to study the chapter 11 is of the opinion that since sale of the whole business is 
essentially affect all the stakeholders' interests, the creditors' protection should not be weaker than the 
general reorganization procedure. Rolef J. de Weijs, Bob Wessels, 'Proposed Recommendations for the 
Reform of Chapter 11 U.S. Bankruptcy Code', Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 2015-14p11 
68 For example, the UK courts are more inclined to reply on insolvency practitioners' views. See 
Bolanle Adebola, 'Proposed feasibility oversight for pre-pack administration in England and 
Wales: window dressing or effective reform?' Journal of Business Law 2015p3 
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creditors become in the money creditors who will share with those hold-out senior 
creditors. 
By considering the group plan, information can be shared with other insolvency 
practitioners or debtor in possession, and more potential bidders may be identified. 
This to some extent rectifies the transparency problems of pre-pack as debtors may 
only disclose information to cherry-picked stakeholders while leaving other creditors 
with nothing.69Considering the group option via communication encourages more 
information to be exchanged so that the relevant parties and courts can make better 
options based on more information. Also, it reduces the level of local creditors' 
control as other insolvency practitioners may provide better offers and challenge the 
local rescue plan. This in turn provides directors and other stakeholders confidence to 
enter into insolvency proceedings.70More plans and discussions based on the 
information so disclosed would make the reorganization more transparent.71The 
opinions of representatives of other junior creditors are also critical for the debtors 
and courts to make sound judgments regarding the option of rescue plans and 
valuation of the business.72Coordinators could be seen as neutral parties73who 
facilitate the group option and monitor the undesirable individual rescue options. 
The cost of exchange of information throughout a group rescue plan may not be 
ignored. The recommendation does not suggest that every subsidiary should consider 
its own version of group plan. Rather, the key is to exchange information so that the 
question whether a group rescue plan is desirable can be answered at an early stage. 
                                                          
69Horst Eidenmüller, Kristin van Zwieten, ‘Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU 
Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency’ ECGI 
Working Paper 301/2015 P13 
70 Harvey R. Miller, 'Chapter 11 in Transition -From Boom to Bust and Into the Future' 81 Am. Bankr. 
L.J. 375 2007 p384 
71 Michelle M Harner, Jamie Marincic, 'Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in 
Business Reorganizations' 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1155 2010-2011 p1181 
72 Michelle M Harner, Jamie Marincic, 'Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in 
Business Reorganizations' 34 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1155 2010-2011 p1182 
73 Similar to ABI commission's idea to appoint a neutral party for the pre-pack deals to monitor the 
process. see ABI Commission to study the reform of Chapter 11 P6 
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Also, the cost as such does not derive from the recommendation itself; it is a general 
drawback of procedural cooperation solutions where the cooperation between 
different parties itself will give rise to costs. Nonetheless, it is a workable framework 
in that it provides certainty to creditors of different subsidiaries in different 
jurisdictions.  
 
To sum up, the insolvency practitioners of member companies should consider group 
rescue options at the time of considering individual rescue options. They should do so 
by disclosing information to other insolvency practitioners in the same group when an 
individual rescue plan is negotiating; they should also discuss the possibility of group 
rescue plans. By considering group rescue plans at an early stage, more information 
and options are available for the relevant parties and insolvency practitioners. It is 
easier for them to decide which options may better serve the creditors in general of 
one member company. As a result, the ability of group coordination proceedings to 
preserve group going concern value is improved. 
 
